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Conventional wisdom says that, in the absence of sufficient default penalties, sovereign risk constrains
credit and lowers welfare. We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption:
that assets cannot be retraded in secondary markets. Once this assumption is relaxed, there is always
an equilibrium in which sovereign risk is stripped of its conventional effects. In such an equilibrium,
foreigners hold domestic debts and resell them to domestic residents before enforcement. In the presence
of (even arbitrarily small) default penalties, this equilibrium is shown to be unique. As a result, sovereign
risk neither constrains welfare nor lowers credit. At most, it creates some additional trade in secondary
markets. The results presented here suggest a change in perspective regarding the origins of sovereign
risk and its remedies. To argue that sovereign risk constrains credit, one must show both the insufficiency
of default penalties and the imperfect workings of secondary markets. To relax credit constraints created
by sovereign risk, one can either increase default penalties or improve the workings of secondary markets.
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jaume.ventura@upf.eduConsider the hypothetical situation of a country that has borrowed in the past and must now
pay back to its foreign creditors. It does not matter whether it was the private sector or the
government who borrowed in the ￿rst place. After all, even government debts must ultimately be
paid by taxing the private sector. The last word on whether the country pays its foreign debt must
come from the country￿ s government however, since nobody else holds enough power to force the
private sector to pay. The problem, of course, is that the government cares more about the private
sector than foreign creditors, and ￿nds it tempting not to enforce payments to foreigners. What
prevents this? Only the expectation of costly default penalties, such as the loss of collateral and
reputation, trade embargoes or even military interventions. These penalties eliminate sovereign
risk, namely, the risk that the country willingly defaults on its foreign debt.
What would happen if these penalties are absent and the government decides not to enforce
payments to foreigners? The standard answer is that foreign creditors will ￿nd at the time of
enforcement that the country defaults on its debt. Once this answer is accepted, one immediately
realizes that the situation being considered is hypothetical and not real. Anticipating default,
foreign creditors could not have lent to the country in the ￿rst place. This inability to borrow
prevents the country from taking advantage of good investment opportunities and from sustaining
its consumption during bad times. Sovereign risk therefore constrains credit and lowers welfare.
To relax this constraint, the country must make itself more vulnerable to default penalties. Only
then foreigners will feel safe enough to lend to the country. This is, we think, a fair description of
conventional wisdom.
This paper reviews the situation above and questions this conventional wisdom. Foreign credi-
tors will not passively hold their debts until the time of enforcement arrives and default takes place.
Instead, they will try to sell them in the secondary market and recover any value they can. Who
will buy these debts? Certainly not other foreign creditors since the government will not enforce
payments to foreigners. But the private sector will be willing to buy these debts if the government
enforces payments to domestics. Moreover, it must be the case that the private sector always has
enough funds to purchase them since otherwise foreign creditors would not have lent in the ￿rst
place. In fact, the main result of this paper is that there is always an equilibrium in which the
private sector buys back the debts at face value and the government chooses to enforce payments
to domestics.1 Moreover, in the presence of (even arbitrarily small) default penalties this equilib-
rium is unique. Hence, secondary markets transfer debts to those that value them most, leading
1The proof of this result is based on two observations. The ￿rst one is that, once the private sector has bought
back the debt, not enforcing domestic payments can at most redistribute wealth within the private sector but cannot
increase its level of wealth. The second observation is that trading in the secondary market always ensures that the
redistribution that would result from not enforcing domestic payments is undesirable for the government.
1to maximization of their value and therefore enforcement. As a result, sovereign risk neither con-
strains credit nor lowers welfare. At most, it creates some additional trade in secondary markets as
foreign creditors successfully circumvent the strategic or opportunistic behavior of the government
by selling their debts to the private sector before enforcement.
The intuition behind this result is that secondary markets create a prisoner￿ s dilemma situation
that forces the country to buy back or repay its debt. It would be better for the di⁄erent members
of the private sector to coordinate actions and not to purchase each other￿ s debts from foreign
creditors. If such collusion were possible, it would lead to default and therefore to an increase in
the wealth of the country. But the capital gains or pro￿ts from violating the agreement would be
enormous for a small or in￿nitesimal individual who can purchase the country￿ s whole foreign debt
at a negligible price expecting to redeem it later at face value. Hence, the agreement is not feasible
and the country as a whole ends up repurchasing all of its foreign debt in the secondary market.
This outcome constitutes an ex-post ine¢ ciency from the viewpoint of the country, but somewhat
paradoxically ensures ex-ante e¢ ciency since it allows the country to borrow in the ￿rst place.
This result provides a useful theoretical benchmark because it identi￿es a set of conditions
under which sovereign risk is irrelevant even in the absence of default penalties. Of course, this is
an idealized situation that requires frictionless secondary markets. Transaction costs, large agents,
government interference and other imperfections might impair the workings of these markets. We
analyze these frictions and show that, in their presence, sovereign risk still constrains credit and
lowers welfare. But the tightness of the credit constraint depends on these secondary-markets
imperfections rather than on the size of default penalties. More generally, the results presented
here suggest a change in perspective regarding the origins of sovereign risk and its remedies. To
argue that sovereign risk constrains credit, one must show both the insu¢ ciency of default penalties
and the imperfect workings of secondary markets. To relax credit constraints created by sovereign
risk, one can either increase default penalties or improve the workings of secondary markets.
There is an extensive literature on sovereign risk that mostly focuses on the role of reputational
considerations and direct penalties.2;3 One problem with these approaches, however, is that there
is not much empirical evidence supporting the view that countries su⁄er losses of reputation or
2See Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Grossman and van Huyck (1988), Bulow and Rogo⁄ (1989a, 1989b), FernÆndez
and Rosenthal (1990), Atkeson (1991), Cole, Dow, and English (1995), Cole and Kehoe (1997), Kletzer and Wright
(2000), Kehoe and Perri (2002), Wright (2002), and Amador (2003). See Eaton and FernÆndez (1995) for an excellent
survey.
3Two recent papers show how, even in the absence of reputational considerations and direct penalties, governments
may enforce/and or make payments to foreigners. Broner and Ventura (2006a) show that when governments cannot
discriminate between domestic and foreign creditors, enforcing foreign payments is useful because it avoids disrupting
domestic ones. Sandleris (2006) shows that when governments have better information than the private sector,
enforcing foreign payments is useful because it provides a good signal about the prospects of the country.
2punishments as a result of defaults. For example, countries do not seem to be excluded from in-
ternational ￿nancial markets for very long after default episodes and defaults do not seem to have
much of an e⁄ect on trade in goods.4;5 Without exception, the existing literature has ignored the
role of secondary markets and taken for granted that, if governments do not enforce and/or make
payments to foreigners, then foreigners cannot collect on their debts. This (implicit) assumption
was justi￿ed when the literature started in the early 1980￿ s, since virtually all emerging market
borrowing was done via syndicated bank loans which were di¢ cult to retrade. However, the institu-
tional setup of emerging-market borrowing has changed dramatically since then: a large fraction of
both government and private borrowing is now done by selling bonds and stocks which are traded
in deep secondary markets.
This paper is also related to the literature on the costs and bene￿ts of debt buybacks.6 This
literature asks whether it is optimal for a country that su⁄ers a debt overhang to repurchase its
foreign debt before the time of maturity. This question is answered from an ￿ ex-post￿perspective
in which the amount of outstanding debt is exogenous to the analysis. We instead focus on repur-
chases of debt at maturity when there is no debt overhang and the amount of outstanding debt is
endogenous to the analysis. These repurchases are clearly suboptimal from an ￿ ex-post￿perspective
since they lead to the country paying back its debt even when there are no penalties for not doing
so. Nonetheless, we ￿nd that these repurchases take place in equilibrium and also that they are
bene￿cial from an ￿ ex-ante￿perspective as they allow the country to borrow.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 proves the main result of the paper in a simple
two-period, two-region setup. The goal is to develop the basic intuitions in a transparent way.
Section 2 proves the main result in a general setup with many regions, many periods, many shocks,
many sources of market incompleteness, and many sources of heterogeneity within and between
regions. This setup encompasses many of the models used by the previous literature. Section 3
explores limits to the argument by introducing imperfections in secondary markets. In particu-
lar, we consider the e⁄ects of transaction costs, large agents, and various degrees of government
commitment. Section 4 concludes.
4With respect to the former, Gelos, Sahay, and Sandleris (2004) ￿nd that the loss of access to international capital
markets after defaults was about four years in the 80￿ s and only a few months in the 90￿ s. With respect to the
latter, the evidence is mixed. Although Rose (2005) argues that there exists trade disruption after defaults, Martinez
and Sandleris (2006) ￿nd that the fall in trade after defaults is the same vis a vis creditor and non-creditor trading
partners, suggesting it is not due to sanctions.
5One way to reconcile theories based on reputation and sanctions with the empirical evidence is to assume that
there are two types of default: excusable and strategic. Excusable defaults are more likely to be observed in equilibrium
and have few negative consequences for the defaulter. Strategic defaults are less likely to be observed in equilibrium
precisely as a result of the threat of loss of reputation and sanctions. See Grossman and van Huyck (1988).
6See Bulow and Rogo⁄ (1988, 1991), Dooley (1988), Froot (1989), Helpman (1989), Krugman (1989, 1992), Sachs
(1990), Kenen (1991), Rotemberg (1991), Detragiache (1994), Diwan and Spiegel (1994), and Fernandez-Ruiz (2000).
31 The basic argument
The main result of this paper is that, if secondary markets work well, it makes no di⁄erence for
consumption and welfare whether we assume that all asset payments are enforced or, alternatively,
we assume that governments strategically choose which ones, if any, to enforce. This result applies
to a very broad class of models, as we formally prove in Section 2. In this section, we prove the
result in a simple setup so as to develop intuition.
1.1 A barebones model of sovereign risk
This section presents one of the simplest worlds in which we can prove our result. We label it the
Debtor-Creditor world and it is as follows:
Example 1 (Debtor-Creditor world). The world lasts two periods: Today and Tomorrow, indexed
by t 2 f0;1g; and it contains two equal-sized regions: Debtor and Creditor, indexed by j 2 fD;Cg.
Let Ij be the set of individuals located in region j, and IW = ID [ IC. Each region contains a
continuum of in￿nitesimal individuals that maximize this separable utility function: U(ci0;ci1) =
u(ci0) + u(ci1) for all i 2 IW; where ci0 and ci1 are used, respectively, to denote the consumption
levels of individual i Today and Tomorrow, and u(￿) is monotonic, increasing and concave. All
debtors (i.e. residents of Debtor) receive an endowment equal to y ￿ " Today and y + " Tomorrow.
All creditors (i.e. residents of Creditor) receive an endowment equal to y + " Today and y ￿ "
Tomorrow.
In the Debtor-Creditor world there are no gains from domestic trade because all individuals
within a region have the same preferences and endowments. But endowments di⁄er across regions
and this creates gains from international trade in bonds. To reap these gains, the world needs
well-functioning bond markets. We refer to the bond markets that open Today and Tomorrow
as primary and secondary respectively. For these markets to work well, bond payments must be
enforced. We shall say that there is full enforcement if the world has institutions ensuring that
governments always enforce bond payments regardless of the parties involved. We shall, instead,
say that there is strategic enforcement if governments choose which bond payments, if any, to
enforce. Our goal is to compare consumption and welfare under these two alternative institutional
setups.
Under full enforcement, bond prices in secondary markets equal their face value. If prices were
below face value, individuals could make a riskless pro￿t by purchasing bonds and redeeming them.
4If prices were above face value, the opposite strategy would then deliver a riskless pro￿t. In primary
markets bonds must promise a zero return given the strong symmetry between periods: there is no






1)￿ = 1 for all j 2 fD;Cg, (1)
where q
j
t is the price in period t of a bond issued by a resident of region j that pays one unit of
output Tomorrow, and the asterisk is used to denote the full-enforcement equilibrium. Since bond
returns are zero, we have the following equilibrium consumption:
(ci0)
￿ = (ci1)
￿ = y for all i 2 IW. (2)
That is, individuals completely smooth their consumption across periods.
Implementing the full enforcement consumption allocation requires debtors to borrow from
creditors. Let x
j
it be the bonds issued by residents of region j that are held by individual i after
trading in period t. There are many possible distributions of bond holdings in the primary market
that support the consumption allocation in Equation (2), given the prices in Equation (1). Among
them, it is customary to choose the distribution that minimizes trade volume:7
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(3)
Equation (3) states that debtors issue " bonds and sell them to creditors. There are even more
distributions of bond holdings in the secondary market that support the consumption allocation
in Equation (2), given the prices in Equation (1). In fact, any redistribution of the original bonds
achieves this since all individuals can directly collect any bond payment under full enforcement. It
is again customary to choose among all of these distributions the one that minimizes trade volume





i0)￿ for all j 2 fD;Cg and i 2 IW. (4)
Note that creditors do not go to the secondary market but instead collect their debts directly
from the original bond issuers. Therefore, the secondary market plays no role under full enforcement
and closing it would have no e⁄ects on consumption and welfare. To sum up, Equations (1), (2),
(3) and (4) provide a complete description of the full-enforcement equilibrium.
7Minimization of trade volume implies that gross and net bond holdings coincide and are both given by x
j
it.
5Under full enforcement, regional governments are assumed to have both the means and the
will to force domestic residents to pay their debts. Under strategic enforcement, governments
are still assumed to have the means to enforce debts but they might not have the will to do so.
In particular, governments choose enforcement after secondary markets close Tomorrow so as to
maximize the average utility of the region, i.e. Wj =
R
i2Ij u(ci1) for all j 2 fD;Cg. Moreover,
governments are assumed to have no credibility so that any promise made before the time of
enforcement is discounted by individuals. To simplify the exposition, assume that governments can
only discriminate bondholders by their characteristics when deciding enforcement. In the Debtor-
Creditor world, this means that governments can only discriminate bondholders by their residence.
It is widely believed that in the Debtor-Creditor world with strategic enforcement international
trade in bonds is not possible since there are no default penalties. The argument goes as follows:
creditors lend Today only if they expect debtors to pay their debts Tomorrow. But Tomorrow
Debtor￿ s government will not force debtors to pay back their debts since this would lower the
average utility of the region. Anticipating this, creditors do not lend Today. There is therefore a
unique equilibrium without international trade in bonds in which each region (and therefore each
individual) consumes its own endowment. We show next why this conclusion is incorrect.
1.2 The role of secondary markets
It is evident that Tomorrow Debtor￿ s government will not enforce payments on bonds held by
creditors. It is also evident that creditors must anticipate this Today. But it does not follow that
creditors do not lend Today since they still have the option of reselling their bonds Tomorrow in
the secondary market. In fact, we show next that in equilibrium bonds trade in the secondary
market at face value. Anticipating this, creditors lend to debtors Today and all gains from trade
are reaped even if governments choose enforcement strategically.
De￿ne e
j
j0 2 f0;1g to be a variable that takes the value one if bond payments from residents
of region j to those of j0 are enforced, and zero otherwise. Under full enforcement, we have
that e
j
j0 = 1 for all j and j0 by assumption. Under strategic enforcement, e
j
j0 is obtained as
part of the equilibrium and must be consistent with government preferences and bond holdings
after the secondary market closes. For instance, assume prices, consumptions and bond holdings
are those of the full-enforcement equilibrium. Since all bonds are in the hands of creditors after
the secondary market closes, this is possible in a strategic-enforcement equilibrium if and only if
Debtor￿ s government prefers to enforce bond payments to creditors. But this cannot be since it














As a result, Equations (1), (2), (3) and (4) cannot all simultaneously be part of a strategic-
enforcement equilibrium.
This does not mean however that consumption and welfare di⁄er between the full- and strategic-
enforcement equilibria. Let a double asterisk denote a strategic-enforcement equilibrium. Assume






1)￿￿ = 1 for all j 2 fD;Cg, (5)
(ci0)
￿￿ = (ci1)
￿￿ = y for all i 2 IW, (6)
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but instead of assuming zero trade in the secondary market, assume that trade in this market leads
to the following distribution of bond holdings:
(xC
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i2ID ￿i = 0 and ￿i ￿ y for all i 2 ID.8 That is, in secondary markets debtors purchase all the
bonds from creditors although not necessarily in a symmetric way. Moreover, assume that Debtor￿ s
government enforces bond payments between debtors:
(eD
D)￿￿ = 1. (9)
The distribution in Equation (8) and the enforcement policy in Equation (9) are consistent
with maximization by both individuals and governments. If Debtor￿ s government enforces bond
payments between debtors, the distribution of bond holdings in Equation (8) is consistent with
individual maximization since all bonds are in the hands of those (i.e. debtors) capable of redeeming
them after the market closes. Otherwise there would be unexploited trade opportunities as those
that cannot collect bond payments would not be selling their bonds to those that can. If individuals
8This distribution is feasible since the secondary market clears and no individual is left with a negative endowment
after trading in it.
7choose the distribution of bond holdings in Equation (8), enforcement of bond payments between
debtors is consistent with Debtor￿ s government maximization. Jensen￿ s inequality implies that this














Therefore, we have shown that Equations (5), (6), (7), (8), and (9) constitute a strategic-enforcement
equilibrium.
Consumption and welfare are the same in the strategic- and full-enforcement equilibria. The only
di⁄erence is the amount of trade in the secondary market. In both equilibria, trading in secondary
markets must ensure that all bonds end up in the hands of those individuals that can collect
payments from bond issuers. Since this is an empty requirement in the case of full enforcement,
minimization of trade volume then leads to zero trade. But this is not an empty requirement with
strategic enforcement. Since creditors hold all the bonds and Debtor￿ s government never enforces
bond payments to them, trade in the secondary market is needed to ensure that all bonds end up
in the hands of debtors. It is easy to check that there are many distributions of bond holdings that
ful￿ll this requirement.
Secondary markets play the usual role of transferring assets to those individuals that value them
most, leading to maximization of asset value. This means moving bonds from those individuals
that cannot collect payments from the original issuers to those that can, leading to maximization of
enforcement. Creditors are willing to sell all their bonds at any positive price since they know that
any bond left in their hands after the market closes will not be enforced. Therefore, the supply of
bonds is vertical. Debtors are willing to buy any quantity of bonds at face value since they know
that bonds left in their hands after the market closes will be enforced. That is, the demand for
bonds is horizontal until all the endowment of Debtor has been exhausted, and downward-sloping
thereafter. The equilibrium price is therefore equal to face value if demand and supply cross in
the horizontal section of the demand curve. But this must be the case since the face value of all
outstanding bonds cannot exceed Debtor￿ s output. Otherwise, we would reach the contradiction
that the full-enforcement allocation implies negative consumption for debtors.
Another useful and intuitive way of thinking about the role of secondary markets is that they
create a prisoner￿ s dilemma situation that forces the region to repurchase or repay its debt. Once
Tomorrow arrives, it would be better for all debtors to agree not to purchase each other￿ s bonds
from creditors. If such collusion were possible, it would lead to default and therefore an increase
in consumption for all debtors. But each debtor has a strong incentive to depart from such an
8agreement. Since creditors are willing to sell their bonds at any positive price, the capital gains or
pro￿ts from violating the agreement would be enormous for a small or in￿nitesimal debtor. Hence,
the agreement is not feasible and the region as a whole ends up paying all of its debts in the
secondary market. This outcome, which constitutes an ex-post ine¢ ciency from the viewpoint of
the region, somewhat paradoxically ensures ex-ante e¢ ciency since it allows for international trade
in bonds Today.
The widespread belief that the absence of default penalties alone leads to a unique equilibrium
without international trade is thus incorrect. This requires the absence of both default penalties and
secondary markets. Closing secondary markets does not make any di⁄erence with full enforcement,
since creditors have the additional option of directly collecting debts from debtors. But closing
secondary markets has dramatic e⁄ects with strategic enforcement, since creditors do not have this
additional option available to them. Once these markets are closed, creditors lose any hope of being
repaid and decide not to lend to debtors. As a result, each region (and therefore each individual)
ends up consuming its own endowment. With secondary markets, government attempts to use
enforcement policy to redistribute from foreign to domestic residents are easily circumvented with
the help of additional trading and without creating any welfare loss. Without secondary markets,
government attempts to use enforcement policy to redistribute from foreign to domestic residents
are also futile. But they destroy valuable international trade and create welfare losses.
To sum up, the strategic-enforcement equilibrium delivers the same consumption and welfare
than the full-enforcement equilibrium, but requires more trade in secondary markets. This addi-
tional trade is however only the ￿rst consequence of moving from full to strategic enforcement.
The observant reader has already noticed a second one, namely, that consumption and welfare are
unique with full enforcement but not with strategic enforcement. Our analysis of the deceptively
simple Debtor-Creditor world is not over yet.9
1.3 Multiple equilibria and welfare
The strategic-enforcement equilibrium described in the previous section is based on the ￿ optimistic￿
belief that Debtor￿ s government will enforce bond payments between debtors. This belief is vali-
dated in equilibrium since trading in the secondary market delivers a distribution of bond holdings
such that Debtor￿ s government chooses to enforce payments on all outstanding bonds. What would
9The full-enforcement equilibrium is unique with respect to consumption and welfare in the Debtor-Creditor world.
But this need not be true in other worlds. We shall show later that for each (of the possibly many) full-enforcement
equilibrium, there always exists a corresponding strategic-enforcement equilibrium that delivers the same consumption
and welfare. What we analyze next is a set of additional strategic-enforcement equilibria that do not correspond to
any full-enforcement equilibrium.
9happen instead if creditors have ￿ pessimistic￿beliefs about enforcement? We show next that it is
also possible to construct equilibria based on various combinations of ￿ optimistic￿and ￿ pessimistic￿
beliefs about enforcement.
Assume individuals are pessimistic and believe Debtor￿ s government will not enforce any bond
payments. Then, there will be no demand in the secondary market and any bond traded there
will command a zero price. This means that the return on any bond purchased in the primary
market must be minus one. Anticipating this, creditors are unwilling to lend to debtors and each
region (and therefore each individual) ends up consuming its own endowment. To conclude that
this is an equilibrium, we must show that the pessimistic belief about enforcement is consistent
with Debtor￿ s government maximization. But this must be the case here. Since no bonds are issued
Today Debtor￿ s government has nothing to enforce Tomorrow. In addition, it is also clear that,
even if an in￿nitesimal subset of creditors deviated and decided to lend, Debtors￿government would
be indi⁄erent between enforcing and not enforcing payments and, thus, not enforcing would be a
best response. Therefore, we have found an additional equilibrium with di⁄erent consumption and
welfare.10
It is easy to show that there are no additional equilibria in our simple world. The reason is that
there is only one meaningful enforcement decision Tomorrow, namely, whether Debtor￿ s government
enforces bond payments between debtors. This is only because we have assumed that governments
cannot make di⁄erent enforcement decisions for di⁄erent groups of residents. But this assumption
was just adopted for convenience. Relaxing it generates additional strategic-enforcement equilibria
with di⁄erent levels of consumption and welfare based on di⁄erent combinations of optimistic and
pessimistic beliefs. The following example makes this point forcefully.
Example 2 (Debtor-Creditor world with names). All assumptions are the same as in the Debtor-
Creditor world, except that individuals are also given one of two possible names: ￿ Dupont￿ or
￿ Dupond￿ .
Although Duponts and Duponds have the same preferences and endowments, their di⁄erent
names allow governments to discriminate between them when deciding enforcement. This is clearly
a minimal departure from the world of the previous section. But it forces Debtor￿ s government to
make another meaningful enforcement decision Tomorrow and this creates two additional equilibria.
10This pessimistic equilibrium is not the same as the equilibrium with missing secondary markets that the previous
literature has focused upon. Pessimism closes the bond market and eliminates all trade, domestic and foreign. Closing
secondary markets geographically segments the bond market eliminating international trade but not domestic trade.
This di⁄erence is obscured in the Debtor-Creditor world because all individuals within a region are identical and
there is no domestic trade in equilibrium.
10For instance, assume individuals believe that Debtor￿ s government will enforce bonds issued by
Duponts and held by other debtors, but it will not enforce any bonds issued by Duponds. Given
these beliefs, Duponts can borrow while Duponds cannot and are therefore forced to consume
their own endowment. Bond returns are negative and all individuals, except for credit-constrained
Duponds, equalize the ratio of their marginal utilities Today and Tomorrow. Duponts are better
o⁄ than in the optimistic equilibrium since the removal of competitors (i.e. Duponds) from the
primary market improves the terms at which they can borrow. But both Duponds and creditors
are worse o⁄ than in the optimistic equilibrium, the former because they cannot borrow and the
latter because they lend at worse terms.11
Under strategic enforcement there is always an ￿ optimistic￿equilibrium with the same consump-
tion and welfare than full enforcement. But we have seen that there are other ￿ pessimistic￿equilibria
too. In the previous examples, these ￿ pessimistic￿equilibria never lead to a Pareto improvement
over full enforcement. But this need not always be the case, as the following example shows:
Example 3 (Lucky-Unlucky world). The world lasts two periods: Today and Tomorrow, indexed
by t 2 f0;1g; and it contains two equal-sized regions: Home and Foreign, indexed by j 2 fH;Fg.
Each region contains a continuum of in￿nitesimal individuals that maximize the already familiar
utility function: U(ci0;ci1) = u(ci0) + u(ci1) for all i 2 IW = IH [ IF. All individuals receive an
endowment of y Today. But Tomorrow there are two states. If s = sH, Home is lucky and its
residents receive an endowment equal to y + ", while Foreign is unlucky and its residents receive
an endowment equal to y ￿ ". If s = sF, Home is unlucky and its residents receive an endowment
equal to y ￿ ", while Foreign is lucky and its residents receive an endowment equal to y + ". Both
states have equal probability.
Clearly there are gains from international risk sharing in the Lucky-Unlucky world. By pooling
their endowments, individuals could eliminate the volatility of their consumption at no cost in terms
of mean consumption. But we shall consider a situation in which insurance markets are missing.
The only asset that can be traded is a non-contingent bond. Under full enforcement there is no
international trade and each region is forced to consume its own endowment. The same happens
under strategic enforcement if beliefs are optimistic. This outcome is not Pareto e¢ cient and the
reason, of course, is that markets are incomplete.
11To check that this is an equilibrium simply note that the belief that bonds issued by Duponts are enforced is
validated in equilibrium and, although the belief that bonds issued by Duponds are not enforced cannot be validated
in equilibrium, it is still consistent with Debtor￿ s government maximization. Naturally, there is another equilibrium
in which it is Duponds who can borrow while Duponts are forced to consume their endowment.
11But there is another equilibrium with a mix of optimistic and pessimistic beliefs that can raise
the welfare of all and lead to Pareto e¢ ciency. Assume individuals believe that the lucky region will
enforce bond payments between its residents, while the unlucky region will not. Given these beliefs,
there is a trading strategy that ensures full risk sharing: in the primary market each individual
buys " bonds issued by residents of the other region and ￿nances this sale by issuing and selling
" bonds. If an individual turns out to be unlucky, he/she will default on his/her bonds and enjoy
a consumption equal to y. If an individual turns out to be lucky, he/she will have a capital loss
equal to " and enjoy a consumption equal to y as well.
What is going on? Pessimism closes markets (such as those for Dupond bonds) and/or leads
to equilibrium default (such as when a region turns out to be unlucky). In the Debtor-Creditor
world markets are complete and, as a result, the full-enforcement allocation is Pareto e¢ cient.
In this ￿rst-best context, closing markets and/or inducing defaults always reduces welfare. In the
Lucky-Unlucky world insurance markets are missing and the full-enforcement allocation is no longer
Pareto e¢ cient. In this second-best context, it is well known that closing some markets and/or
using defaults to change the span of existing assets might lead to Pareto superior outcomes. This
classic second-best intuition explains why pessimistic beliefs might sometimes lead to higher welfare
than optimistic ones.12
Up to this point we have shown that: (i) there is always an optimistic equilibrium that deliv-
ers the same level of consumption and welfare as the full-enforcement equilibrium; (ii) there are
additional strategic-enforcement equilibria with di⁄erent levels of consumption and welfare based
on pessimistic beliefs about enforcement; (iii) the optimistic equilibrium need not be the one that
delivers the highest possible welfare. The last topic we address here is robustness.
1.4 Robustness
Assume governments su⁄er a penalty b every time they decide not to enforce payments to foreigners.
We shall think of b as being arbitrarily small but strictly positive. In particular, in the Debtor-








for all j 2 fD;Cg. This small modi￿cation to our environment is of interest because
it eliminates all equilibria based on pessimistic beliefs leaving the optimistic equilibrium as the
unique strategic-enforcement equilibrium. Moreover, it is consistent with previous literature that
has emphasized the role of default penalties.
To understand this result, it is worth being more explicit about why pessimistic beliefs are
12This example also shows that our results do not depend on assuming that markets are complete. The opti-
mistic strategic-enforcement equilibrium replicates the consumption and welfare of the full-enforcement equilibrium
regardless of whether the latter is Pareto e¢ cient or not.
12consistent in the Debtor-Creditor world without default penalties, i.e. b = 0. Assume all individuals
expect Debtor￿ s government not to enforce bond payments to debtors. We have argued that in this
situation creditors do not lend to debtors and the government does not have to make a decision.
How do we know that there are no unexploited trade opportunities? Imagine an in￿nitesimal
creditor deviates and decides to lend. This creditor will certainly ￿nd a debtor that is willing to
borrow. Naturally, this creditor will not be able to collect the bond payment directly from the
original issuer and must go to the secondary market to sell the bond. But would this creditor
￿nd a debtor that buys the bond in the secondary market? The answer is negative since debtors
expect their government not to enforce even if any of them deviates. After all, the government
is indi⁄erent between enforcing or not enforcing an in￿nitesimal bond payment since the e⁄ect of
this decision on its welfare is negligible. This is exactly why individuals take enforcement decisions
(and prices, of course) as given.
Assume next that there is a small but strictly positive default penalty, i.e. b > 0. Then, a
pessimistic belief about enforcement is not consistent with individual maximization since it leaves
unexploited trade opportunities. To see this, consider again a situation in which there is no trade
due to pessimistic beliefs about enforcement. Like the previous case, a creditor that deviates and
decides to lend will ￿nd a debtor that wants to borrow. But unlike the previous case, this creditor
will now be able to collect the bond payment directly from the original issuer. The reason, of course,
is that creditors expect that an in￿nitesimal bond payment will lead the government to enforce.
The welfare e⁄ect of enforcing an in￿nitesimal bond payment to a foreigner is negligible. But now
the government wants to avoid the (possibly small but not negligible) default penalty. Knowing
this, creditors will lend and a situation in which there is no trade due to pessimistic beliefs about
enforcement cannot be an equilibrium. We therefore add a fourth and ￿nal item to our list of
results: (iv) only the optimistic equilibrium survives the introduction of (even arbitrarily small)
default penalties.
This leads us to select the optimistic equilibrium for the Debtor-Creditor world. We then refer
to the di⁄erences between this equilibrium and the full-enforcement one as the e⁄ects of sovereign
risk. Our main result is that, if individuals can freely retrade existing assets, sovereign risk has no
e⁄ects on consumption and welfare. The only e⁄ect of sovereign risk is to increase trade volume
as individuals trade not only to smooth their consumption but also to circumvent the strategic or
opportunistic behavior of governments.
132 The general case
Results (i)-(iv) were obtained with the help of a very stylized setup. This was useful to build
intuitions. But these results apply to a very broad class of models that encompasses many of those
that have been used in the previous literature. In this section, we provide a formal proof of these
results in a general setup with many regions, many periods, many shocks, many sources of market
incompleteness and many sources of heterogeneity within and between regions.
For obvious reasons, the style of this section is more formal and technical than that of the
previous one. Some readers might prefer to read ￿rst Section 3 where we go back to the informal
style of Section 1 and use simple variants of the Debtor-Creditor world to show the limits of the
argument and develop further intuitions.
2.1 The model
Consider a world economy with J regions, indexed by j 2 J ￿ f1;2;:::;Jg, so that J is used
to denote both the number and the set of regions. Each region contains a continuum of in￿n-
itesimal individuals. We use Ij to denote the set of individuals located in region j, whereas
IW =
SJ
j=1 Ij denotes the total population of the world. Let j(i) denote the region where individ-
ual i lives, namely j(i) = | ￿if i 2 I| ￿; let ￿j(i), on the other hand, denote the set of regions di⁄erent
from j (i), namely ￿j(i) = Jnj(i).
The world lasts for T + 1 ￿ 1 periods, which are indexed by t 2 T ￿ f0;1;:::;Tg. Hence, T
denotes both the last period and the set of all periods. At the beginning of each period, a shock
st 2 S is realized. We use ht ￿ [s0;s1;:::;st] 2 Ht to denote the history of realizations of the shock
up to period t. Let H ￿
S
t2T Ht denote the set of all histories. The probability of observing a
history h￿, conditional on having observed a history ht, is denoted ￿(h￿ jht).
In each period t, after the shock is realized individuals receive a non-negative endowment yiht of
a perishable consumption good.13 We allow for heterogeneity in endowments within and between







￿(h￿ jht) ￿ uih￿(cih￿) for all ht 2 H and i 2 IW, (10)
where cih￿ denotes consumption by individual i at history h￿. All utility functions uiht(￿) are either
monotonic and strictly concave or zero,14 and that they can vary across histories and individuals.
13This constitutes a slight abuse of notation since ht indicates both that output takes place at t and that the
history at that time is ht. A similar convention will be used throughout this section.
14We allow uiht(￿) = 0 to account for overlapping generations models.
14Individuals can trade in asset markets. More speci￿cally, in each period t the timing of events
is as follows: the shock realizes and individuals receive their endowment, asset markets open and
individuals retrade existing assets and issue new ones, enforcement of maturing asset payments
takes place, and individuals consume. Although we allow for various restrictions in terms of asset
structure, we assume that markets are frictionless and therefore all individuals in all histories can
trade existing assets costlessly.
The asset structure of this economy is characterized by a set of available assets N. The payment
promised by asset n 2 N at history ht is denoted by dhtn. We use Nht to denote the subset of assets
for which dhtn > 0. We allow for fairly general constraints on the types and amounts of assets that
may be issued at each history by each individual. For example, (i) there may be no assets that pay
in certain histories; (ii) there may be constraints on the contingency of assets, such as only allowing
for non-contingent bonds; (iii) agents might face individual-speci￿c constraints that limit the type
and number of assets that they can issue; (iv) an asset may be issued in some histories but not
in others. The only assumption we make on the asset structure itself is that asset payments are
￿separable￿ . That is, for each asset, there always exists a portfolio of existing assets that allows
us to replicate each payment separately. This assumption is su¢ cient but not necessary for our
main result to hold and its implications are highlighted below. The simplest environment in which
payments are separable is one in which each asset n has a unique maturity period, which we will
assume from now on: Nh￿ \ Nh￿￿ = ? for all h￿, h￿0 2 H, ￿;￿0 2 T, and ￿ 6= ￿￿ .
The economy described so far is general enough to encompass many of the previous models used
in the literature as particular cases. In terms of asset structure, for example, we can replicate the
bond models commonly used in the literature. Such is the case if for all ht;(ht)
0 2 Ht, t 2 T, we
impose d(ht)0n = dhtn for all n 2 Nht. Our framework is also consistent with the two benchmark
models in terms of demographics:
￿ In￿nitely-lived representative-agent model: let T = 1 and assume identical utilities, endow-
ments and asset-market restrictions for all individuals in any given region.
￿ Overlapping-Generations economies ￿ la Samuelson: let individuals be partitioned into co-
horts I
j
t for t 2 T and j 2 J. An individual i 2 I
j
t resides in country j and ￿lives￿during peri-
ods ft;t + 1;:::;t + l ￿ 1g where l is the number of periods individuals live. For an individual
i 2 I
j
t, uih￿(￿) = 0, yih￿ = 0, and issuance at ￿ are zero for all ￿ = 2 ft;t + 1;:::;t + l ￿ 1g.
Perhaps the only important limitation of our framework is that it does not allow for investment.
We however conjecture that the results presented here would also apply to a richer framework that
allows for it.
152.2 Enforcement
Up to now, we have described the structure of our economy without making any reference to
how promised asset payments are enforced. We now describe the two alternative scenarios. The
￿rst scenario is that of full enforcement. It consists simply of our economy with the additional
assumption that all payments are enforced, regardless of the parties involved. In this scenario, all
individuals know that they will have to deliver all the payments promised by any asset that they
issue and that they will receive all the payments promised by any asset that they purchase.
The second scenario is that of strategic enforcement. It consists of our economy under the
assumption that each region has a government that decides strategically on the enforcement of
payments. We assume that governments have no ability to commit ex-ante to enforcing or to not
enforcing payments. That is, governments make a decision regarding the enforcement of outstanding
payments owed by their residents at each history ht, after trade in asset markets has taken place.
Hence, at any given history ht 2 H, the government of region j 2 J must decide on the enforcement
of payments promised by assets n 2 Nht whenever these assets have been issued by some individual
i 2 Ij. When deciding on enforcement at history ht, the government of region j maximizes
Z
i2Ij
￿i ￿ Uiht, (11)
where ￿i ￿ 0 is the weight that the government assigns to the utility of individual i. Note that
governments attach zero weight to the utility of foreigners.
Once it is assumed that governments can decide on the enforcement of di⁄erent payments, we
need to specify the enforcement technology that they have access to. We assume that governments
can make di⁄erent enforcement decisions for di⁄erent payments owed by its residents. In partic-
ular, governments can discriminate according to the characteristics of issuers and holders. To be
more precise, recall that we have allowed for individual heterogeneity in endowments, preferences,
restrictions on asset issues and government weights. Let us partition the population of each region
into groups of individuals with the same characteristics. In other words, let us partition the popu-
lation of Ij, j 2 J, into groups g 2 Gj where Ij =
S
g2Gj g, such that - if g(i) denotes the group of
individual i - for all i;i ￿2 Ij, g(i) = g(i ￿ ) only if (a) yiht = yi ￿ ht for all ht 2 H; (b) uiht = ui ￿ ht for
all ht 2 H; (c) individuals i and i ￿face the same restrictions on the types and amounts of assets
that they may issue; and (d) ￿i = ￿i ￿. Note that this means that all individuals in a given group
have the same characteristics, but it does not rule out the possibility of there being two individuals
with the same characteristics in two di⁄erent groups. We let GW =
S
j2J Gj denote the set of all
groups in the world.
16We allow governments to discriminate according to the groups of the issuer and holder when
enforcing payments. However, we assume that the government cannot discriminate based on the
identity of the individual issuer and holder. In other words, if a government enforces the payment
on asset n 2 N from individual i 2 g to individual i0 2 g0 in a given history ht 2 H, then it must
enforce all payments on asset n from individuals in g to individuals in g0 in that history. For g 2 Gj,
let e
g
g ￿ htn 2 f0;1g denote the decision of the government of region j regarding the enforcement of
payments on asset n owed by individuals in group g, to individuals in group g ￿ , at history ht.15 We
use e
g
g ￿ htn = 1 to denote enforcement of such payments, and e
g
g ￿ htn = 0 to denote non-enforcement.
The government does not make a decision regarding the enforcement of assets that have not been
issued by any of its residents. In order for individuals to take enforcement decisions as given in
equilibrium, we assume that all groups g 2 GW have positive mass.
This completes our description of the economy under the alternative scenarios of full and strate-




htn denote the price of asset n issued by an individual that belongs to group g at history ht.
Let xi ￿
ihtn denote the holdings of asset n by individual i, issued by individual i0, before trading in
asset markets at history ht. If i0 6= i, xi0
ihtn ￿ 0 since i cannot hold a negative amount of assets issued
by i0. But xi
ihtn ￿ 0 since it denotes the (negative of the) outstanding assets issued by individual i.
Let ^ xi ￿
ihtn denote the holdings of asset n by individual i, issued by individual i0, after trading in
asset markets at history ht. Naturally, for all non-maturing assets at history ht (i.e. n 2 Nh￿ with
￿ > t) it must be the case that xi ￿
iht+1n = ^ xi ￿
ihtn for all ht+1 consistent with ht. Also, xi
ih0n = 0 since
the ￿rst time at which individuals can issue assets is when asset markets open in period 0. Let the









ihtn) denote individual i￿ s net holding of asset n
issued by members of group g at history ht, before (after) asset markets open.
Then, the budget constraints faced by an individual i 2 IW at history ht 2 H are given by
















15In each history ht the government of region j 2 J has 2(#Gj)￿(#GW)￿(#Nht) potential enforcement choices, where
#G
j denotes the number of groups in region j, #G
W denotes the number of groups in the world, and #Nht denotes
the number of maturing assets.






















where ^ yiht denotes the endowment left in the hands of individual i after trading in asset markets
and xi
ihtn must always satisfy the issuing constraints that individual i 2 IW faces with respect
to asset n 2 N. Equation (12) states that an individual cannot have negative endowment after
trading in asset markets, while Equation (13) states that an individual￿ s consumption can be no
greater than his endowment after trading in asset markets plus the net payments received from
maturing assets. The latter takes into account the fact that not all payments from maturing assets





ihtn = 0 for all ht 2 H, n 2 N, and g 2 GW. (14)
An equilibrium of the economy with full enforcement is a set of: (i) asset prices; (ii) consumption
pro￿les and asset holdings, and; (iii) enforcement decisions, such that individuals and governments
correctly anticipate asset prices and enforcement decisions whenever these are observed and (a)
all individuals maximize expected utility (Equation (10)) subject to their budget (Equations (12)
and (13)) and issuing constraints, (b) governments always enforce payments, and (c) markets clear























There are always many equilibria with the same consumption and prices (and, trivially, enforce-
ment) but di⁄er in their pre- and/or post-trade asset holdings. The Debtor-Creditor world of
Example 1 illustrates this. In addition, there might be equilibria with di⁄erent consumption and
prices. For instance, the class of economies being considered includes OLG economies that can
have bubbly equilibria.
An equilibrium of the economy with strategic enforcement is a set of: (i) asset prices; (ii) con-
sumption pro￿les and asset holdings, and; (iii) enforcement decisions, such that individuals and
governments correctly anticipate asset prices and enforcement decisions whenever these are ob-
served and (a) all individuals maximize expected utility (Equation (10)) subject to their budget
(Equations (12) and (13)) and issuing constraints, (b) governments maximize their objective func-
tion (Equation (11)), and (c) markets clear (Equation (14)). We shall denote strategic-enforcement























The only di⁄erence between the full- and strategic-enforcement equilibria is the behavior of gov-
ernments. In the former governments maximize enforcement, while in the latter they choose en-
forcement to maximize a weighted average of the utility of the residents of their region.
2.4 Main result
Our main result is that for each full-enforcement equilibrium there is a corresponding strategic-
enforcement equilibrium that delivers the same consumption pro￿les and, therefore, the same level
of welfare. We now prove this result in the general setup described above, thereby substantially
extending result (i) of Section 1:
Proposition 1. Consider an economy satisfying the previous assumptions regarding preferences,





































































￿￿￿ for all ht 2 H, n 2 N,
g 2 GW, and i 2 IW.
We prove this Proposition by construction. Consider the following pair of pro￿les of post-trade
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19where ￿ihtn 2 R such that
R
i2g ￿ihtn = 0 and
P
n2Nht ￿ihtn ￿ (ciht)
￿ for all ht 2 H, n 2 Nht,
g 2 GW, and i 2 IW. Equation (15) states that, after trading in asset markets, all maturing assets
are held by individuals that belong to the same group as the issuer, while non-maturing assets
are held as in the full-enforcement equilibrium. Equation (16) states that governments enforce
























is an equilibrium of the strategic-enforcement economy.
We ￿rst show that the proposed equilibrium satis￿es individual maximization. Prices are the
same as in the full-enforcement equilibrium and, in particular, maturing assets still trade at face
value. As a result, the consumption pro￿les and the pre-trade asset holdings of the full-enforcement
equilibrium must also be consistent with individual maximization under strategic enforcement.
Also, the fact that maturing assets trade at face value also implies that (a) individuals are in-
di⁄erent between buying or not buying maturing assets issued by members of their same group;
and (b) individuals prefer (at least weakly) to sell maturing assets issued by members of di⁄erent
groups. In addition, individuals are satisfying their budget constraints. Equation (13) is satis￿ed
because maturing assets trade at face value and all payments are enforced. And Equation (12)
is also satis￿ed because it follows from Equation (13) and the condition
P
n2Nht ￿ihtn ￿ (ciht)
￿.16
Finally, individuals satisfy their issuance constraints since their issuance is the same as in the
full-enforcement equilibrium.
We next show that the proposed equilibrium also satis￿es government maximization. The
analysis is substantially simpli￿ed by the fact that, since enforcement only a⁄ects current con-
sumption, we only need to check that governments do not have incentives to deviate at any one































ghtn = 1 for all g 2 Gj and n 2 Nht, the government of j guarantees that consumption
is equalized within each domestic group, i.e. (ciht)
￿ = (ci0ht)
￿ whenever g(i) = g(i ￿ ). Choosing any
16The assumption that asset payments are separable ensures that all groups have enough funds to repurchase at
face value all the assets that they have issued in the past and mature at the considered history.
17Note that this is true even in environments with multiple equilibria in which enforcement might serve as a sunspot.
It is obvious that in the full-enforcement economy enforcement cannot serve as a sunspot. As a result, we just need
to consider cases in which enforcement does not serve as a sunspot in the strategic-enforcement economy either.
20other enforcement would not a⁄ect total consumption in each group but will, in general, lead to
consumption inequality within groups. A straightforward application of Jensen￿ s inequality shows
then that the proposed enforcement is a best response for governments.
Finally, we show that the proposed equilibrium satis￿es market clearing. This is clearly the case










i2g ￿ihtn = 0 for all ht 2 H and g 2 GW. With this, we complete the proof of the
proposition.
We have shown that (a) if governments enforce within-group payments, individual maximization
leads to each group purchasing its own maturing assets; and (b) if each group purchases its own
maturing assets, government maximization leads to within-group enforcement. This combination
of asset trade and enforcement always allows the economy with strategic enforcement to achieve
the same consumption pro￿les and welfare as the economy with full enforcement. This is su¢ cient
to prove Proposition 1. In general, there are many alternative combinations of asset trade and
enforcement that achieve the same result. These alternatives involve groups with large weights in
the governments objective function and/or low consumption purchasing maturing assets issued by
other groups.
2.5 Additional strategic-enforcement equilibria
We have shown that each full-enforcement equilibrium has a corresponding strategic-enforcement
equilibrium that delivers the same consumption pro￿les and, therefore, welfare. We next show
that there is a set of additional strategic-enforcement equilibria that do not correspond to any full-
enforcement equilibrium and deliver di⁄erent consumption pro￿les and welfare. These additional
equilibria describe situations in which individuals expect some asset payments not to be enforced.
As shown in Section 1.3, this can lead to some asset markets being closed and/or some asset
payments being defaulted in equilibrium.






= 0 for all ht 2 H, n 2 Nht, and g;g0 2 GW. (17)










= 0 for all ht 2 H, n 2 N, and i;i0 2 IW,
since no individual is willing to hold any assets. This, in turn, implies that governments never
21have to make an enforcement decision in equilibrium, so that individual expectations regarding
enforcement are neither con￿rmed nor disproved and are therefore consistent with equilibrium.
Moreover, individuals have no incentive to deviate, since they understand that non-enforcement
of an in￿nitesimal amount of outstanding assets is a possible best response by the government.
Hence, the strategic-enforcement economy always has a ￿pessimistic￿equilibrium in which there is
no trade in assets because everyone expects that no promises will ever be enforced.
Besides equilibria that implement the full-enforcement allocation and the pessimistic equilibrium
just described, the strategic-enforcement economy will typically have other equilibria in which there
is less than full enforcement because some -but not all- asset payments are expected not to be
enforced. To see this, consider that expectations regarding enforcement are as in (17) except for






= 1 for all ht 2 H, n 2 Nht. This enforcement
pro￿le will generically deliver an equilibrium with positive trades of assets issued by group g, so
that consumption pro￿les will be di⁄erent from those of the pessimistic equilibrium but also from
the ones that would arise under full enforcement. Examples of this type of equilibria were provided
in Section 1.3. Proposition 2 summarizes the discussion:
Proposition 2. Consider an economy satisfying the previous assumptions regarding preferences,
endowments, asset markets, and enforcement technology. Under strategic enforcement, such an
economy always has at least two types of equilibria. On the one hand, there is a set of equilibria
that implement the full-enforcement consumption pro￿les as characterized in Proposition (1). On
the other hand, there is always a pessimistic equilibrium in which no assets are traded because no
payments are expected to be enforced. There may also be additional equilibria in which asset trades
and enforcement are observed, but in which they are not enough to achieve the full-enforcement
consumption pro￿les.
This proposition substantially extends result (ii) of Section 1. Naturally, result (iii) follows
directly from our analysis of the Debtor-Creditor with names and the Lucky-Unlucky worlds.
2.6 Robustness
We show next that the additional strategic-enforcement equilibria that do not correspond to any
full-enforcement equilibrium are not robust to the introduction of even arbitrarily small default
penalties. These penalties make the expectation of non-enforcement inconsistent with individual
maximization.
Consider now that our economy is modi￿ed by introducing an arbitrarily small default penalty,
denoted by b. It is assumed that b is the cost that must be borne by a government whenever it
22chooses not to enforce a payment owed by a group of its residents to a foreign group. Hence, the
government of region j 2 J maximizes the following objective function at any given history ht
Z
i2Ij














g0ht ￿ Nht denotes the set of maturing assets issued by at least one individual in group g
and held by at least one individual in group g0.
As long as b > 0, regardless of how small it is, this economy does not have any pessimistic
equilibria. To see why, consider the equilibrium in which no assets are traded because expectations
regarding enforcement are as in Equation (17). In such an equilibrium it must be the case that
q
g
htn = 0 for all ht 2 H, n 2 N and g 2 GW. But given these prices, individuals have an incentive
to deviate once they understand that governments face a cost of non-enforcement. Consider, for
example, that an individual purchases an asset issued by a resident of region j at price zero: when
the asset matures, there will always be a resident of region j0, with j0 6= j, willing to buy it. This
will force the government of region j to make an enforcement decision. To do so, it will compare
the bene￿t of not enforcing this payment, which is negligible, with the default penalty, which is
strictly positive. Naturally, the latter e⁄ect will always outweigh the former and the government
will always ￿nd it optimal to enforce the payment. Anticipating this, individuals always have an
incentive to deviate. Hence, pessimistic equilibria disappear with the introduction of a slight cost
of non-enforcement.
Consider next the set of equilibria that attain the full-enforcement consumption pro￿les. Clearly,
these equilibria are also equilibria of the economy when b > 0: this perturbation will only increase
the bene￿t of enforcing payments, so all payments that were enforced in the original economy will
be also enforced in the perturbed economy. Proposition 3 summarizes the discussion above:
Proposition 3. Consider an economy satisfying the previous assumptions regarding preferences,
endowments, asset markets, and enforcement technology. Assume that governments face a penalty
b > 0 whenever they choose not to enforce a payment owed by a group of their residents to a foreign
group. Under strategic enforcement, the only equilibria of such an economy are those that attain
the consumption pro￿les that would arise under full enforcement.
This proposition substantially extends result (iv) of Section 1. In what follows, we select the
set of optimistic equilibria and refer to it as ￿ the￿set of strategic-enforcement equilibria.
233 Limits to the argument
The general setup of Section 2 encompasses many of the models commonly used to study the
e⁄ects of sovereign risk. Unlike the previous literature, however, we have allowed individuals to
freely retrade existing assets. This turned out to be a crucial change in assumption since it leads
to the new result that, even in the absence of default penalties, sovereign risk does not a⁄ect
consumption and welfare. Perhaps surprisingly, the only e⁄ect of sovereign risk is to increase trade
volume as individuals trade not only to redistribute their consumption across periods and states of
nature, but also to circumvent the strategic or opportunistic behavior of governments.
Although the setup of the previous section is quite general in comparison with standard practice,
it still remains a very stylized description of reality. It is therefore useful to explore the limits of
our argument by relaxing those assumptions that seem to be playing a more important role in the
proof of our result. In particular, we focus next on the following ones:
1. No transaction costs. All individuals can trade in asset markets with zero transaction costs
in all periods and states of nature.
2. Small agents. All individuals are in￿nitesimal and, as a result, they take prices and enforce-
ment decisions of governments as given.
3. No commitment. Governments are not credible and any promise they make before the time
of enforcement is discounted by individuals.
A complete treatment of the e⁄ects of relaxing these assumptions in the general setup of Sec-
tion 2 is beyond the scope of this paper. We instead return to the Debtor-Creditor world of Section 1
and develop further variants of it to sketch the main implications of allowing for transaction costs,
large agents and commitment.18
3.1 Transaction costs
In Section 2 we considered a rich set of restrictions on the issuance of new assets. These restrictions
a⁄ect both the set of contingencies that assets can incorporate and the set of individuals that can
issue them in each period and state of nature. When these restrictions are binding, useful assets are
missing and pro￿table trade opportunities are lost. As a result, the equilibrium is Pareto ine¢ cient.
18Another assumption that might turn out to be important is that, for each asset, there exist always a portfolio
of existing assets that allows us to replicate each asset payment separately. This assumption is su¢ cient (but not
necessary) to ensure that there are enough funds in the secondary market to purchase all assets that deliver payments
at face value. Relaxing this assumption might lead to situations in which the secondary market is not liquid enough
and this creates problems. Given the current length of this paper, we do not analyze this case here.
24But even in this case, we have always allowed all individuals (including those that cannot issue
new assets) to freely trade all existing assets in all periods and states of nature. That is, although
we allowed for restrictions in the number and type of assets that can exist, we also assumed that
those assets that do exist are traded frictionlessly. This assumption is important since we have
argued that sovereign risk only increases trade volume and this has no welfare consequences. What
happens instead if this additional trade is costly? The next example introduces transaction costs
in the Debtor-Creditor world:
Example 4 (Debtor-Creditor world with transaction costs). All assumptions are as in the Debtor-
Creditor world, except that buyers and sellers must now pay a proportional or ad valorem transaction
cost equal to tB and tS, respectively.
With full enforcement, creditors collect bond payments directly from the issuers of the bonds
and, as a result, they only go to the primary market. This means that the relevant bond return
for them is
1
q0 ￿ (1 + tB)
, while the relevant bond return for debtors is
1 + tS
q0
. The wedge between
these bond returns is (1+tB)￿(1 + tS). Naturally, the model of Section 1.1. applies as the case in
which transaction costs are negligible, i.e. tB = tS = 0, and there is no wedge. Starting from this
benchmark or limiting case, increases in tS reduce the supply of bonds while increases in tB reduce
the demand for bonds. Both shifts lead to lower trade and less consumption smoothing. Eventually,
the combined value of transaction costs crosses the threshold that makes them prohibitive:
(1 + tB) ￿ (1 + tS) =
￿
u0 (y ￿ ")
u0 (y + ")
￿2
.
At this point, all trade disappears and each region consumes its own endowment.
With strategic enforcement, creditors cannot collect bond payments directly and are forced to
sell their bonds in the secondary market. As a result, the relevant bond return for them is now
q1
q0 ￿ (1 + tB) ￿ (1 + tS)
. Debtors only purchase their bonds in the secondary market if those are sold
with a discount that compensates for the transaction cost: q1 ￿ (1 + tB) = 1. Therefore, the wedge
between bond returns is now one order of magnitude higher than in the full enforcement case,
(1 + tB)2 ￿ (1 + tS)2. The reason, of course, is that the additional trading in the secondary market
implies that transaction costs are paid twice. Starting from the limiting case of zero transaction
costs, we ￿nd again that increases in tS reduce the supply of bonds. But now they also reduce the
demand for bonds since now creditors must also pay these transaction costs Tomorrow when they
sell their bonds in the secondary market. Moreover, increases in tB lead now to a larger reduction
25in the demand for bonds since they have the additional e⁄ect of lowering the price of bonds in the
secondary market. Like the case of full enforcement, increases in transaction costs lower trade and
consumption smoothing. But this now happens at a faster rate since each transaction cost applies
twice to each bond payment. Note also that the threshold that makes transaction costs prohibitive
is lower now:
(1 + tB) ￿ (1 + tS) =
u0 (y ￿ ")
u0 (y + ")
.
This example shows how sovereign risk magni￿es the negative e⁄ects of transaction costs on
consumption and welfare. With transaction costs, the full- and strategic-enforcement equilibria
are still similar qualitatively but might di⁄er quantitatively. Knowing that Debtor￿ s government
will not enforce bond payments to creditors, the latter are forced to go to the secondary market
to sell their bonds and must incur additional transaction costs. Since these additional costs are
pure waste, sovereign risk lowers the level of consumption. Since these additional costs increase the
wedge between bond returns for debtors and creditors, sovereign risk also worsens the intertempo-
ral distribution of consumption. The strategic or opportunistic behavior of Debtor￿ s government
remains futile, but it now causes a welfare loss.
Another popular model of transaction costs assumes that some individuals have negligible costs
of going to the market, while the rest have prohibitive costs. This structure of costs gives rise to
limited participation. Although transaction costs are never paid in equilibrium, the absence of some
individuals from the market might also restore a negative role for sovereign risk, as the following
example illustrates:
Example 5 (Debtor-Creditor world with limited participation). All assumptions are as in the
Debtor-Creditor world, except that only a fraction ￿
j
t of individuals in region j can trade in period t.
With full enforcement, there is trade only in the primary market. If ￿C
0 = ￿D
0 , limited participa-
tion a⁄ects the demand and supply for bonds symmetrically and the price of bonds remains one. As









participation reduces more the demand (supply) for bonds, the price of bonds falls below (goes
above) one, and market participants choose an upward-sloping (downward-sloping) consumption
pro￿le. In any event, those that cannot participate in the primary market are forced to live in au-
tarky and consume their own endowment. Since the secondary market is not used, the equilibrium
outcome does not depend on who can participate in it.
26With strategic enforcement, creditors that purchased bonds in the primary market want to go
to the secondary market and sell their bonds at face value. If this is possible, limited participation
does not a⁄ect our results. But two things can go wrong however.
The ￿rst potential problem is default. If the probability of participating in the secondary
market conditional on having participated in the primary market is less than one, say ￿ < 1, there
is default on a fraction 1 ￿ ￿ of the bonds issued in the primary market. Default prevents the
Debtor-Creditor world from achieving the full-enforcement allocation, except for the special case
in which default risk is only idiosyncratic.19 Defaults create undesirable redistributions between
creditors and debtors that make consumption Tomorrow risky. This ￿rst e⁄ect is negative for both,
debtors and creditors. There is a second e⁄ect on bond returns that depends on the third derivative
of the utility function. If the latter is positive, we have the standard case of precautionary savings
in which increases in uncertainty lower bond returns. This terms-of-trade e⁄ect bene￿ts Debtor
and hurts Creditor. The net e⁄ect of default risk is therefore negative for Creditor but ambiguous
for Debtor. Naturally, the opposite is true if the third derivative of the utility function is negative.
The second potential problem is that debtors that participate in the secondary market do
not have enough resources to repurchase the full-enforcement stock of bonds at face value, i.e.
￿D







￿. It is clear that, in this case, the strategic enforcement equilibrium will


























￿￿￿￿ ￿ < 1.








We could examine the e⁄ects of introducing other trading frictions. But the two examples of
this section already convey a simple and, we think, quite robust intuition: since additional trade
is needed to circumvent the strategic or opportunistic behavior of governments, sovereign risk
magni￿es the negative e⁄ects of trading frictions on consumption and welfare.
19Assume that ￿ is known and that ￿
D
1 is always large enough to ensure that all bonds are traded at face value
in the secondary market. Then, there is no default risk in the aggregate and there are no discounts. Debtors can
diversify away default risk simply by borrowing from many di⁄erent creditors. Creditors can also diversify away
default risk by buying insurance from each other for a value ￿ of the face value of their debt. This additional trade in
the primary market permits creditors that cannot access the secondary market to collect their debts from creditors
that do. Since enforcing these insurance payments raises average utility, Creditor￿ s government will always enforce
them. Under these circumstances, bond prices in the primary market simply re￿ ect the probability of default, i.e.
(q0)
￿￿ = ￿ ￿ (q0)
￿. Since bond returns are the same as under full enforcement and no transaction costs are paid in
equilibrium, the strategic-enforcement equilibrium delivers the same consumption and welfare as the full-enforcement
one.
273.2 Large agents
An important assumption that we have made throughout the paper is that agents are small, in
the sense that they take enforcement decisions and asset prices as given. This assumption has
two important implications that we have invoked repeatedly for our result, namely: (a) there are
always individuals who are willing to repurchase maturing assets at face value in the secondary
market and; (b) these individuals actually have the resources to do so. In this section, we explore
the implications of relaxing the assumption of small agents, by allowing for agents with positive
mass or ￿large￿agents. As we now show, the presence of such agents may substantially a⁄ect the
demand for maturing assets in the secondary markets.
We begin by framing our discussion within a variation of our Debtor-Creditor world that allows
for large agents:
Example 6 (Debtor-Creditor world with large agents). All assumptions are as in the Debtor-
Creditor world, except that now: (i) there is a continuum of in￿nitesimal debtors with mass ￿D that
make their decisions collectively (i.e., a Debtor Bank), and, (ii) there is a continuum of in￿nitesimal
creditors with mass ￿C that also make their decisions collectively (i.e., a Creditor Bank).
Suppose ￿rst that ￿D = 1 and ￿C = 0. Under full enforcement, the presence of a large agent
a⁄ects the equilibrium because it has market power. In fact, the Debtor Bank is a monopolist in
the bond market Today: consequently, it will restrict the supply of bonds in order to raise their




￿￿ > 1. Under strategic enforcement, though, the
e⁄ects of having a unique debtor are much stronger, to the extent that Debtor is unable to borrow
at all. The reason is simple: suppose the Debtor Bank issues any positive amount of bonds Today.
Creditors purchase these bonds because they expect to sell them Tomorrow before enforcement.
Once Tomorrow arrives, though, the Debtor Bank will never buy any of its bonds in the secondary
market. It understands that, by purchasing its bonds at any positive price it is simply transferring
resources to creditors. Therefore, it must necessarily be the case that (qD
1 )￿￿ = 0 in equilibrium.
Anticipating this, creditors will not buy any bonds Today and the only possible equilibrium is one
of autarky in which each region consumes its endowment.
What insight do we gain from this example? In the original Debtor-Creditor world, secondary
markets are able to achieve the full-enforcement allocation because each individual debtor has
a strong incentive to purchase bonds issued by other debtors. This outcome, which constitutes
an ex-post ine¢ ciency from the viewpoint of the region, ensures ex-ante e¢ ciency by allowing for
international trade in bonds Today. But this prisoner￿ s dilemma type of situation only arises insofar
28as debtors are small and behave non-cooperatively. If there is a unique debtor, as in our example,
this reasoning no longer applies.
Of course, the case in which ￿D = 1 is rather extreme, since the Debtor Bank is the only
potential purchaser of its bonds in the secondary market. We now turn to the more interesting case
in which ￿D < 1. We maintain ￿C = 0. Under full enforcement, the equilibrium is qualitatively
similar as before: the Debtor Bank still has market power, so that the supply of bonds is lower,
and their market price Today higher, than what they would be in the traditional Debtor-Creditor
world. Under strategic enforcement, though, the presence of small debtors can make a substantial





￿￿￿ bonds Today. When secondary markets open, small debtors are willing to
buy any quantity of bonds at face value. Therefore, their aggregate demand for bonds is horizontal
until all the combined endowment of small debtors has been exhausted, and downward-sloping
thereafter. The equilibrium price is therefore equal to face value if their combined endowment is
su¢ cient to repurchase all the bonds issued in the primary market at face value. In this case, and
despite the large agent, the strategic-enforcement equilibrium delivers the same allocation as the
full-enforcement one.
To make the example interesting, assume from now on that ￿D is su¢ ciently large to ensure
that the combined endowment of the small debtors is not enough to repurchase all the bonds issued
in the primary market. In this case, small debtors will use all of their endowment to purchase
bonds in the secondary market.20 But this is not the end of the story: once small debtors purchase
bonds in the secondary market, it is in the interest of the Debtor Bank to enter the market as well.
Assume not. Then, the Debtor Bank could make a pro￿t by buying its own bonds at a discount
instead of paying face value later when small agents come to redeem them. In equilibrium, the
Debtor Bank will buy bonds up to the point in which this gain is o⁄set by the increase in price of


























￿￿￿ < 1, which is decreasing in ￿D and approaches zero as ￿D ! 1.
Hence, equilibrium borrowing in Debtor is restricted with respect to the full-enforcement economy.
When the large agent is not too large, the Prisoner￿ s dilemma is only partially solved and Debtor
20As long as u(0) = ￿1, domestic payments are always enforced in equilibrium. We maintain this assumption
throughout the section for simplicity.
29can still borrow but not as much as it would like.
Before concluding, we wish to remark on the e⁄ects of allowing for large creditors. We now do
so by setting ￿C = 1. We also maintain ￿D < 1. A ￿rst natural consequence of having a unique
creditor - which is valid both under full and strategic enforcement - is that he will be a monopsonist
in the primary market for bonds. This will exert downward pressure both on the price of bonds
and on the amount of trade in the primary market. However, the presence of a large creditor does
not a⁄ect the functioning of the secondary market. It could be thought that the Creditor Bank has
an incentive to restrict the supply of bonds Tomorrow in order to raise their price, but it is never
pro￿table to do so. This is evident if ￿D = 0 and the Creditor Bank can sell all bonds at face value.
It is also evident if ￿D = 1 and the Creditor Bank is unable to sell them at any positive price. It
can also be shown that if ￿D 2 (0;1), restricting the supply of bonds is still not worthwhile because
this decreases the Debtor Bank￿ s demand for bonds more than proportionally (see Equation (18)).
There are therefore two main ￿ndings in this section. The ￿rst one is that coordination among
debtors might restrict their collective ability to borrow. In fact, imagine that the government of
Debtor generates an institutional arrangement that forces debtors to coordinate their actions. In
a world of full enforcement, this would be a perfectly sensible policy from the viewpoint of Debtor,
since it would allow its residents to exploit their collective market power and access international
capital markets at better terms. In a world of strategic enforcement, on the other hand, this
institutional arrangement might back￿re if it persists until the time of enforcement. The same
market power that bene￿ts debtors at the time of borrowing allows them to distort the outcome of
the secondary market: in the extreme case in which all residents of Debtor coordinate their actions,
as we have seen, the latter e⁄ect manifests itself fully and eliminates all possibility of international
borrowing.
The second ￿nding of this section is that coordination among creditors does not enhance their
ability to collect on maturing assets. Coordination among creditors certainly enhances their market
power and allows them to lend at a higher interest rate. How much they actually collect from
their outstanding loans at the time of maturity, though, is ultimately determined by the degree of
coordination among debtors. In our world, then, institutional arrangements such as collective action
clauses, which are designed to coordinate creditors in order to enhance repayment, are ine⁄ective.
The reason for this is clear: creditors in our environment never receive payments directly from
debtors, so that coordinating does not bene￿t them in terms of negotiation or bargaining power.
Indeed, they are only able to collect from maturing assets by selling them in the secondary market.
Since coordination does not enable them to distort the outcome of the latter in their favor, their
ability to extract resources from debtors is not a⁄ected by it.
303.3 Commitment
Up to now, we have referred to the ability of secondary markets to restore the full-enforcement
allocation when governments have no commitment and choose enforcement strategically. This
situation is often referred to as ￿ discretion￿ in the time-inconsistency literature. Some readers
might have wondered why, instead of referring to an economy with full enforcement, we have not
used the more common terminology of an economy in which governments have full commitment.
Would these two alternatives not be fundamentally the same? In this section we show that they
are not.
The widespread notion that full commitment leads to full enforcement is based, we think, on the
prevalence of models with complete markets and representative agents. Consider, for instance, the
Debtor-Creditor world with transaction costs of Example 4. If Debtor￿ s government could commit
and choose enforcement policy Today, it would choose to enforce all payments. This choice would
make trading in the secondary market unnecessary, would save on transaction costs, and would
therefore maximize the average utility of debtors ex-ante. As a result, in this case full commitment
leads to full enforcement.
When markets are incomplete, full commitment does not in general lead to full enforcement.
Consider, for instance, the Lucky-Unlucky world of Example 3, in which each region contains a
representative individual but markets are incomplete due to the absence of contingent bonds. As
we argued in Section 1.3, in this world the full-enforcement allocation is ine¢ cient. In fact, with
full enforcement asset trade is useless. If Home and Foreign had full commitment, they would
agree Today on the following enforcement policy: the lucky region enforces all bond payments,
while the unlucky region enforces none. This pattern of enforcement would increase the span of
non-contingent bonds and lead to higher ex-ante expected utility for all individuals in the world. As
a result, in this world full commitment would raise welfare by preventing secondary markets from
leading to the full-enforcement allocation. This is therefore a world in which discretion delivers the
full-enforcement allocation, but full commitment does not.21
When agents are heterogeneous, full commitment does not even lead to a Pareto improve-
ment. Consider, for instance, the Debtor-Creditor world with names of Example 2 but assume that
Debtor￿ s government only cares about Duponts, i.e. WD =
R
i2ID ￿i ￿ u(ci1) with ￿i = 1 if i is a
Dupont and ￿i ￿ 0 if i is a Dupond. In this world markets are complete but there is heterogeneity
within the Debtor region. If Debtor￿ s government had full commitment, it would choose to enforce
21Note that this equilibrium is observationally equivalent to the equilibrium with a mix of optimistic and pessimistic
beliefs that we studied in Section 1.3. With discretion, we showed that this equilibrium was neither unique nor robust.
With full commitment, this equilibrium is both unique and robust.
31bond payments by Duponts and not to enforce bond payments by Duponds. This would e⁄ectively
remove Duponds from the primary market, lowering the supply of bonds and improving the terms
at which Duponts borrow. This enforcement policy would raise the welfare of Duponts and that
of Debtor￿ s government at the expense of Duponds (and creditors). As in the previous case, full
commitment does not lead to the full-enforcement allocation.22 Unlike the previous case, gaining
full commitment does not lead to a Pareto improvement for debtors because Debtor￿ s government
uses this power to redistribute between groups of individuals.23
The case of full commitment is probably too extreme. While governments might have some
ability to commit, it is not realistic to assume that they can commit for the inde￿nite future.
What would be the e⁄ect of less extreme degrees of commitment? To answer this question, in the
remaining of the section we analyze the case of ￿short-term￿commitment, in which we assume that
governments make their enforcement decisions for each period before secondary markets open in
that period.24
Interestingly, short-term commitment tends to have more negative e⁄ects on enforcement and
asset trade than full commitment. For example, in both the Debtor-Creditor and the Lucky-
Unlucky worlds introducing short-term commitment completely destroys asset trade. The reason is
that before secondary markets open Tomorrow the government of any region whose residents owe
payments to foreigners understands that its residents are about to repay their debts to foreigners
via secondary markets. But such a government would prevent these payments by committing not to
enforce payments among domestic residents thereby driving the secondary-market price of domestic
debt to zero. Of course, anticipating this Today the residents of the other region are not willing
to purchase domestic debt and, thus, there is no trade in the primary market. Gaining short-
term commitment destroys all trade and forces each region and individuals to consume their own
endowment. Everybody (including governments) is worse o⁄.
Although governments always have an incentive to commit not to enforce to avoid payments to
foreigners, there may be countervailing forces that might lead to enforcement and asset trade even
when governments have short-term commitment. The next two examples illustrate two such cases.
The ￿rst example generalizes the Debtor-Creditor world by introducing a role for domestic trade
in primary markets and shows how this can reduce the governments￿ability to preempt payments
to foreigners:25
22Despite the preference for Duponts, the consumption allocation without commitment would still be the same as in
the full-enforcement equilibrium. This is because Debtor￿ s government would not need to enforce bond payments from
Duponts to Duponds since in the secondary market only Duponts would purchase bonds issued by other Duponts.
23Idem footnote 21.
24Alternatively, we could assume that governments make their (contingent) enforcement decisions for each period
after asset markets close in the previous period.
25This example is a stylized version of the worlds considered by Broner and Ventura (2006a, 2006b). Broner and
32Example 7 (Debtor-Creditor world with ￿ ex-post￿ inequality). All assumptions are as in the
Debtor-Creditor world, except that now debtors are subject to idiosyncratic shocks Tomorrow. In
particular, there are two states Tomorrow, s1 and s2, each taking place with probability one half. If
a given debtor is lucky, he receives y+"+￿; otherwise, he receives y+"￿￿. Debtors are partitioned
into two halves, I1 and I2, such that all i 2 I1 are lucky in state s1 and all i 2 I2 are lucky in
state s2.
In this version of the Debtor-Creditor world there are gains from domestic trade because there
is ￿ ex-post￿heterogeneity among debtors. The basic Debtor-Creditor world of Example 1 applies
as the special case in which ￿ = 0. We assume that markets are complete and that there are two
assets: asset 1 pays one in state s1 and zero in state s2, and asset 2 pays zero in state s1 and one in
state s2. In the full-enforcement equilibrium all debtors and creditors consume y in both periods.
If ￿ ￿ ", this consumption allocation can (but need not) be implemented with only international
trade. If ￿ > ", this consumption allocation also requires domestic asset trade between debtors. It
is straightforward to check that in the cases of discretion and full commitment consumption and
welfare are the same as in the full-enforcement equilibrium. However, this is not always true with
short-term commitment.
The key e⁄ect of short-term commitment in this world is that enforcement becomes non-
discriminatory. In particular, while Debtor￿ s government can still choose enforcement before in-
dividuals trade in secondary markets, it cannot discriminate between debtor and creditor asset
holders. The reason is that even if Debtor￿ s government committed only to enforcing payments
between debtors, creditors would resell their assets in the secondary market to debtors at face value
and would de facto receive their payment. Thus, if Debtor￿ s government wants to avoid payments
to creditors, it must commit not to enforce any payments. This introduces a crucial trade-o⁄:
committing not to enforce avoids payments to creditors and increases the average consumption of
debtors, while committing to enforce preserves payments between debtors and improves the dis-
tribution of consumption among them. Enforcement will take place if and only if the following
condition holds:
u(y) ￿
u(y + " + ￿) + u(y + " ￿ ￿)
2
. (19)
Equation (19) is satis￿ed if idiosyncratic shocks are su¢ ciently large relative to regional shocks and
the utility function is su¢ ciently concave. In this case, preserving domestic payments is worth more
Ventura (2006a) use a generalization of this model with many goods and transport costs to study the e⁄ects of
trade integration on the structure of asset markets, domestic and international risk sharing, and welfare. Broner and
Ventura (2006b) use another generalization of this model with capital accumulation to study the e⁄ects of ￿nancial
integration on consumption, investment, economic growth, and welfare.
33than avoiding foreign ones. If this condition holds, the economy with short-term commitment also
implements the full-enforcement allocation. If this condition fails, however, the only equilibrium
is one in which there is no trade and each individual consumes its own endowment. In the latter
case, gaining short-term commitment destroys both domestic and international asset trade and
everybody (including governments) is worse o⁄.
Short-term commitment gives Debtor￿ s government the ability to preempt the secondary mar-
ket and render it ine⁄ective. However, the situation is not the same as one in which secondary
markets are simply missing. When secondary markets are missing, the government can discriminate
between domestic and foreign payments and would choose to enforce the former but not the latter.
This destroys international asset trade but does not a⁄ect domestic asset trade. When there are
secondary markets and governments have short-term commitment, on the other hand, depending
on whether Equation (19) holds either both international and domestic asset trade are unrestricted
or neither is possible.
The second example shows that, when there are more than two periods and we allow for long-
term assets, individuals can reduce the governments￿ability to preempt payments to foreigners:
Example 8 (Debtor-Creditor world with three periods). All assumptions are as in the Debtor-
Creditor world, except that now there are three periods, Today, Tomorrow, and The-Day-After,
indexed by t 2 f0;1;2g. The-Day-After all individuals in the world receive an endowment equal
to y.
Assume ￿rst that the only available assets are short-term bonds. In particular, Today individuals
can only issue bonds that pay Tomorrow, while Tomorrow they can issue bonds that pay The-Day-
After. The full-enforcement allocation is characterized by all individuals in the world consuming y
in each of the three periods. Today debtors sell " bonds to creditors, which they repay Tomorrow.
The-Day-After all individuals simply consume their own endowment. The analysis of the cases of
discretion, full commitment, and short-term commitment are essentially the same as in the model
with two periods. With either discretion or full commitment the full-enforcement allocation is
achieved. With short-term commitment, on the other hand, no asset trade is possible and individuals
are forced to consume their endowment in each of the three periods. Does adding a third period
then not make any di⁄erence? It does, if we allow for long-term bonds.
Assume now that Today individuals can also issue long-term bonds that pay The-Day-After.
What would happen if Today debtors sold " long-term bonds to creditors? With full-enforcement,
34debtors would repurchase these bonds from creditors Tomorrow. By doing so they would end
up consuming y both Tomorrow and The-Day-After, while any individual who did not do this
would consume y + " Tomorrow and y ￿ " The-Day-After. But note that the same would happen
with short-term commitment. Since these bonds are enforced The-Day-After, Debtor￿ s government
makes its enforcement decision only after secondary markets close Tomorrow. But by then debtors
have already repurchased all bonds at face value from creditors! As a result, with long-term bonds
the full-enforcement allocation is achieved even with short-term commitment.26;27
The intuition for this result is that, just as governments have an ex-post incentive to preempt
secondary markets and avoid payments to foreigners, domestic residents have an incentive to issue
assets of a long-enough maturity to preempt such government intervention. There is an interesting
parallel between Example 8 and the rest of the paper. Just as we had previously shown that allowing
for additional markets, which are redundant with full-enforcement, can increase enforcement, Ex-
ample 8 shows that allowing for additional assets, which are also redundant with full-enforcement,
can also increase enforcement.
The examples and discussion of this section show that the connection between commitment,
enforcement, and the role of secondary markets is a subtle one. A full analysis of this connection
is well beyond the scope of this paper. Despite this, a few suggestive results have already been
obtained. When secondary markets work well, all asset payments are enforced and commitment
can only reduce enforcement. With full-commitment, this reduction in enforcement need not be
welfare reducing if markets are incomplete and/or agents are heterogeneous. Although with short-
term commitment the reduction in enforcement is more likely to be welfare reducing, we have shown
that there may be countervailing forces. First, when there is not only international but also domestic
asset trade, the e⁄ect of short-term commitment on enforcement depends on whether domestic or
foreign payments are more important. While it is possible for enforcement to be maintained, it is
also possible that domestic asset trade be destroyed along with international asset trade. Second,
the maturity of assets can play an important role in the e⁄ects of short-term commitment on
enforcement.
26Example 8 suggests an interesting relationship between the length of commitment, the persistence of endowment
shocks, and the maturity of assets. We conjecture that assets need to have a long enough maturity relative to the
persistence of shocks and length of commitment, so that they can be repurchased while endowments are high but
before the government decides enforcement.
27In reality, bonds often have acceleration clauses that might facilitate default. Example 8 suggests that such
clauses might have unintended costs in terms of enforcement.
354 Concluding remarks
Conventional wisdom views the problem of sovereign risk as a technological one: it arises whenever
default penalties are insu¢ cient to ensure that governments enforce payments to foreigners. The
result is a credit constraint that lowers welfare. This problem is typically exacerbated if the private
sector does not take into account the e⁄ects of its actions on enforcement decisions, thereby creating
various externalities. Guided by this assessment of the problem, policy prescriptions to reduce
sovereign risk have focused on ￿ghting these externalities. For instance, the government might
want to tax or restrict foreign borrowing by the private sector. Also, the government might want to
favor increased trade ties and other forms of foreign dependence that make the country vulnerable
to foreign retaliation.
This conventional wisdom is based on the extreme view that assets cannot be retraded in
secondary markets and that, in the absence of commitment or reputational considerations, it is
only default penalties that sustain international asset trade. Here we have presented the opposite
and also extreme view that default penalties are negligible and that, in the absence of commitment
or reputational considerations, it is only the ability to retrade assets in secondary markets that
supports international asset trade.
This radical change of assumptions generates a new or unconventional view of sovereign risk as
a problem of missing or imperfect markets. If secondary markets work well, foreign creditors can
always use them to circumvent the strategic or opportunistic behavior of governments and there is
no problem to speak of. It is only the malfunctioning of these markets that constraints credit and
lowers welfare. This alternative assessment of the problem gives rise to a new and di⁄erent set of
policy prescriptions to reduce sovereign risk. Insofar as the problem of sovereign risk is symptomatic
of underlying market imperfections, it should be addressed by policies aimed at developing new
secondary markets or at improving the functioning of existing ones.
Extreme assumptions are a key ingredient of useful theory since only they can reveal each
di⁄erent face of a problem clearly and one at a time. Of course, in the real world these faces appear
blurred and simultaneously. We therefore think that the results of this paper do not contradict the
conventional wisdom, but instead complement it in a fundamental way. Sovereign risk is a serious
problem in real economies and this is due to both the insu¢ ciency of default penalties and the
imperfect workings of secondary markets. Policies aimed at reducing sovereign risk should take
this into account.
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